EUROPA - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Romanian Power Exchange: EUROPA - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Romanian Power Exchange.
Please note that OPCOM is the sole power exchange allowed to operate in Romania - previous attempts by the Romanian Commodities Exchange to open a second ring for trading of energy encountered technical and administrative hurdles and such efforts are now hampered by the new energy law. Consequently, OPCOM has 100% on most markets for the trading of energy.
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Tuesday, December 11, 2012
Tuesday, November 13, 2012
Intellectual property vs.competition - the debate is heating on
UPDATE
According to a study made by Professor Coleen Chien of Santa Clara University, the majority of the patent infringement lawusits brought in 2012 (up to December 1) were initiated by Patent Assertion Entities (vehicles which do not manufacture goods but only license the patents) - http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57558384-93/patent-trolls-now-behind-most-patent-infringement-lawsuits/.
The percentage is worrisome - 62% - up from just 45% in 2011 ! At this pace, the patent trolls will fully occupy the ground of patent litigation by 2014, at the latest.
An equally worrisome finding of the study is that the preferred target of the lawsuits are the startups, weaker in terms of the capacity to whitstand costly legal battles on patents. History shows us that startups were often very innovative and produced that kind of ”disruptive innovation” that the business needs - were where Facebook, Twitter or even Google not so many years ago ?
The solutions for preventing the side effects of such perinicious litigation may not go as far as limiting the IP rights (although reforms may be useful, in US and elswhere) but taking into account proposals such as those put forward by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154203. Professor Hovenkamp argues, basically, that 1. As long as a patent is included in a standard - by an SSO - injunction should not be allowed and 2. The patents which are part of the standards and are, later on, assigned to a non-practising entity are encumbered by the obligation to be licensed on a FRAND basis (except if the assignee was not informed and properly consulted in respect of the inclusion in the standard).
The solutions seems reasonable and with no prejudice to both the patent owners and other entities in the market.
Richard Posner and Garry Becker re-opened recently, on their (common) blog the debate around the likely effects on competition of the rights conferred by the intellectual property protection laws http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html# and http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/reforming-the-patent-system-toward-a-minimalist-system-becker.html.
According to a study made by Professor Coleen Chien of Santa Clara University, the majority of the patent infringement lawusits brought in 2012 (up to December 1) were initiated by Patent Assertion Entities (vehicles which do not manufacture goods but only license the patents) - http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57558384-93/patent-trolls-now-behind-most-patent-infringement-lawsuits/.
The percentage is worrisome - 62% - up from just 45% in 2011 ! At this pace, the patent trolls will fully occupy the ground of patent litigation by 2014, at the latest.
An equally worrisome finding of the study is that the preferred target of the lawsuits are the startups, weaker in terms of the capacity to whitstand costly legal battles on patents. History shows us that startups were often very innovative and produced that kind of ”disruptive innovation” that the business needs - were where Facebook, Twitter or even Google not so many years ago ?
The solutions for preventing the side effects of such perinicious litigation may not go as far as limiting the IP rights (although reforms may be useful, in US and elswhere) but taking into account proposals such as those put forward by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp - http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154203. Professor Hovenkamp argues, basically, that 1. As long as a patent is included in a standard - by an SSO - injunction should not be allowed and 2. The patents which are part of the standards and are, later on, assigned to a non-practising entity are encumbered by the obligation to be licensed on a FRAND basis (except if the assignee was not informed and properly consulted in respect of the inclusion in the standard).
The solutions seems reasonable and with no prejudice to both the patent owners and other entities in the market.
Richard Posner and Garry Becker re-opened recently, on their (common) blog the debate around the likely effects on competition of the rights conferred by the intellectual property protection laws http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html# and http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/reforming-the-patent-system-toward-a-minimalist-system-becker.html.
What is obvious is that the current patent and copyright regulations show little adaptation to the modern
business - characterised by speed and continnuous innovation.
There are positions even more extreme than those of R.Posner and G.Becker - see, for instance M.Boldrin, D.K.Levine, ”The case against patents” at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
Jared Diamond (teaching ....geography and evolutionary biology, not antitrust) noticed, in his Pulitzer-awarded book "Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies" - that most scientific progress resulted from accumulation on preexisting discoveries and not from isolated acts of genius. When these met a market demand, they started to be called "great inventions" (this statement is also quoted by Herbert Hovenkamp in "The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution").
A good argument in favour of the IP rights is that provided by Michael Phelps, Vice-President for IP at Microsoft, in the book he co-authored with David Kline - "Burning the ships. Intellectual Property and the Transfomation of Microsoft". He also starts from the reality that IP rights have a negative usage - "the right to either prevent someone from using your technology and competing in your market, or to tax them in the form of licensing fees for the right to do so". But Phelps emphasizes that IP rights may be used more efficiently as "a bridge to collaboration with other firms that would enable companies to acquire technologies and competencies they need to compete successfully.[.....] Without IP rights, firms would resist sharing their ideas for fear that others would misappropriate their innovations.[....] Just as good fences made good neighbors, strong IP rights would make for strong and successfull collaborations." This philosophy was at the foundation of the "Open for Business" program run by Microsoft since 2003 and it visible in the multitude of cross-licensing which exist today.
Cross-licensing has its own downsizes, such as the risk of collusion among the competitors which share their patents and the risk of exclusion of firms which have little or nothing to offer in return in a cross-licensing agreement (new firms would more often find in this situation). Therefore, the cross-licensing does not solve the (alleged) excess of market power of the rights holders but it rather allows alliances among the "titans", which would exclude even more the "pygmies".
With the increased complexity and speedy evolutions in industries such as the telecommunications (where no single company owns all the patents considered to be "standards-essential"), the right balance is a non-achieved goal.
The numerous "patent wars" raging through the world of technology in the recent years (Apple vs.Samsung, Samsung vs.Apple, Apple vs.Motorola, Microsoft vs.Google and so on) are mostly a symptom of the mentioned situation, in the context of an out-of-date legislative framework. The question is not whether these wars are bad or good for the competition - or, perhaps, just "growing pains" - but which are the likely effects on innovation in the technology markets (is this slowed down by the legal disputes ?) and on consumer welfare, eventually.
Using the public enforcement of the antitrust rules in the attempt to cool down the rising temperatures in the patent wars should be made with a great deal of care. Investigations and analysis of the antitrust agencies may be very useful in claryfing the attitude that patent holders should have in order not to deter competition and innovation. On the other hand, too much peace and harmony in such industries would be equally alarming. If the antitrust agencies decide to enter into the game and serve as referees, they should make sure that they will preserve the beauty and the dynamics of the game.
Sunday, November 4, 2012
Tuesday, October 23, 2012
La Commission Europeenne repousse Arnaud Montebourg
Sunday, October 14, 2012
La tentation d'ouvrir la boite de Pandore (The temptation to open the Pandora's box)
The
recent proposals of Monsieur Arnaud Montebourg, the French minister for
productivity recovery (yes, there is such a position in the French government -
"redresseement productif", in original, in French), raised some eyes
brows.
M.Montebourg addressed a letter to the President of
the European Commission, in which it pleads for a change in attitude of the
Commission, in order to allow European undertakings to withstand, as
M.Montebourg puts it, "unfair competition" from companies in China,
India, Korea and elsewhere outside the European Union. It looks like the
letter has been endorsed by the corresponding ministers from Italy, Germany,
Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg and Romania - http://www.euractiv.com/innovation-enterprise/montebourg-china-us-industries-b-news-515372.
Mr.Montebourg would like the European Commission to
smooth the state aid rules and allow the states to subsidize "new
industrial sectors: nanotechnology, smart grids and new materials".
The purpose looks fine and the proposal seems to look ahead, trying to offer a
bright future to such new technologies.
Whilst speaking of "unfair trade", Mr.Montebourg
might refer, in fact, to levelling the playing field, a necessary endeavour in
the globalised world.
However, Mr.Montebourg seems rather to look back, into
the industrial past of Europe. He complains about the ”de-industrialisation of
Europe” and wants "protection from our global competitors". If
Mr.Montebourg would have said "we want to outpace our global
competitors", I could embrace (cautiously) his ideas for a reform of the
state aid legislation. But from his words, Mr.Montebourg seems to be a
nostalgic, rather than a forward-thinking politician. He seems to invite
to protectionism rather than to substantial solutions for boosting the productivity
of the EU manufacturing industries.
For these reasons, at least, such proposals deserve
attention and require careful consideration, so they do not become the road
paved with good intentions which would drive EU to hell.
In my practice, I met and I heard too many times the
expression "unfair competition", referring not to outrageous
situations where one or more companies enjoyed better market position due to subsidizes
or other state privileges. In most cases, the persons complaining of the
negative effects of an alleged unfair trade were companies which either refused
or were unable to adapt their business behaviour, so to withstand more
efficient competitors, through cutting costs or more innovation. From
this personal experience, I am reluctant to complaints of unfair trade, phrased
in general terms and not referring to specific situations and based on clear evidence
of actions counter to the principles of the fair trade.
I agree, however, that absence of state aid
restrictions and environmental obligations in countries such as China or India
would put EU companies at disadvantage. Obligations and liabilities
imposed through regulation are a cost for business but there is no evidence
that this is what makes EU industry less competitive. Although
Mr.Montebourg does not mention the United States as a villain, US companies
perform better than their European competitors but this is not necessarily due
to the fact that US does not have a system of control of the state aid
(agriculture and aircraft industry might be counter-examples to this
statement).
The answer to the challenge put by the mondialisation
and the lower standards applied in countries outside EU is not easy and should
not be based on solutions such as "let's do what they do".
Relaxing the rules may be a good idea, provided that it is about reducing
bureaucracy and that the reform is applied indiscriminately to business
undertakings, whether these are from EU or from other jurisdictions.
Lowering the standards in terms of environmental protection, on the other
hand, would produce more negative than positive effects. Raising barriers
to companies from outside the European Union may result in retaliatory measures
from the home countries of these companies.
Triggering (unnecessary or unwise) commercial wars could prove
detrimental to EU business and consumers.
Starting from this perspective and in the light of
proposals such as those put forward by Mr.Montebourg and the other minister, it
would be worth opening a discussion on what the European Union should do in
order to withstand the fierce competition from the new economies. The
solutions must be based on a sound understanding of the reasons of the weakness
of the EU economy and they must look at the long term effects of the policy which
should be adopted by the EU member states.
The debate and
the proposed solutions may develop around the proposals of the
European Commission, presented on 10 October 2012 - http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/mission-growth/index_en.htm. Although these proposals are presented as
general objectives, they intend to induce internal changes –”a sound and
profound reshape of the industrial base”, not just to raise barriers or relax
state aid rules.
The temptation
to open the Pandora’s box is strong.
It should be resisted.
Friday, September 14, 2012
The Commission vs.Gazprom
Professor Alan Riley has a thoughtful article in Wall-Street Journal - http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443921504577643173700034222.html - on the stakes of the recent investigation opened by the European Commisson into EU dealings of the giant Gazprom.
This investigation, like any other investigation of the
European Commission, lies on real (and worrisome) antitrust issues. The opening
of this case, like any other investigation, does not mean that Gazprom is
guilty but that its contracts require a closer look. In the same line of
arguments, I would add that Gazprom would be better off if it accepts that DG
Competition does not operate with preconceptions and it provides all the
necessary data to the Commission.
If Gazprom will decide to raise the veil, this strategy will go counter to its
interests in EU as it may be regarded as an admission that something is rotten
in its EU business and may accelerate the development of alternative sources of
supply.
What is very interesting is that, in fact, the European Commission already won this case - just by starting putting
questions about the "king's clothes", how true are these and what impact the behavior of the king has in the European markets.
These contracts exist from such a long time that people take them as granted,
like being part of the business tradition. Their clauses came into discussion rarely and this happened rather accidentally and in moments of crisis
The success of the investigation means that, notwhitstanding its conclusions, at the
outset the life in EU will not be the same for Gazprom.
Update: The European Parliament adopted on 13 September 2012 a new legislation aimed at better coordination of the energy deals with third countries - see more details at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120907IPR50830/html/Better-coordinated-EU-external-energy-policy
Update: The European Parliament adopted on 13 September 2012 a new legislation aimed at better coordination of the energy deals with third countries - see more details at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20120907IPR50830/html/Better-coordinated-EU-external-energy-policy
Smartphones, mobile networks and competition
The
author's point in this aticle - http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-fi-mo-iphone-wireless-subsidies-20120912,0,7775846.story - is mostly correct.
I would add that subsidizing handsets works in
a similar way with taxation - a few benefit but everybody pays. The subsidies
of the mobile phone companies are eventually costs, "shared" by all
the subscribers of that network - the recovery of the "hole" from an
increase usage of mobile data is made over a long period of time and sometimes the recovery does not come at all.
Subscribers often refrain from using network data in favour of free wireless
hotspots, which are at hand in more and more places (besides, most smartphones
allow to activate a setting which allows downloads and streamig only on a
hotspot).
Another issue is that there is no direct correlation between the price of a handset and its utility. This means that a more expensive smartphone does not trigger more data usage than a lower-price smartphone. The number of applicatons available on each smartphone has a much larger impact on the volume of data.
In the current context, the producers of handsets enjoying high brand reputation enjoy significant market power over the carriers. On the other hand, the carriers may fight back by offering mobile devices under their own brand. There are such devices in the offer of any major carrier. Their role would be somehow similar to the role of the private labels in the retail trade.
On the other hand, the carriers may decide to give up the subsidies on the mobile handsets, or at least of the most expensive ones.
There is hence a major problem here: which network will give up first in this
"arms race"? High-end devices tend to be also "must'have" items, important for marketing purposes too - enhancing the image of the network as promoter of the most modern technology.
From a competition perspective, this issue deserves an in-depth analysis, based on the specific information from the market.
Friday, August 31, 2012
Too young, too good to die - Johnny Munkhammar
On 13 August 2012 Johnny Munkhammar was finally defeated by a merciless malady and he stepped out of this world !
He really was to young to die (not even 38) and he was to good to die !
Johnny Munkhammar was, as he put it, a person who worked "for personal liberty, a free economy and society, open borders and limited government".
He made essential contributions to the effort to preserve the freedom of the market and the openess of the economy.
Johny was deeply convinced of the benefits of the free market and free trade. He was speaking from the heart and he was a truly believer in the economic freedom and the small state and a "preacher" of their virtues.
I would mention only a few of his works, published in English, for which Johnny Munkhammar will be certainly remembered:
- "European Dawn. After the Social Model" (2005).
- The chapter on"A New European Model" in the book "Development Models, Globalization and Economies, A Search for the Holy Grail?", edited by John Kidd and Frank-Jürgen Richter .
- The chapter titled "The Wellfare State or the Unfair State ?" (an excellent question!) in the book "Beyond the European Social Model" (2006) - http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/PDFs/fullbook.pdf.
- His chapter about labour freedom in the annual "Index of Economic Freedom" 2007.
- "What competition has done for Europe" (2007) - http://www.timbro.se/pdf/what_competition_has_done_for_europe.pdf.
- "The Guide to reform" (2007)
- "Yes, Europe can !" written together with Stefan Folster.
In addition, he spoke at conferences around the world, always in defence of freedom and for a measured government intervention. You may see just one of his speeches at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrOBdbnYtJY.
In addition, he spoke at conferences around the world, always in defence of freedom and for a measured government intervention. You may see just one of his speeches at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrOBdbnYtJY.
Johhny Munkhammar has been an amazing character. In an Europe in which the politicians rarely dare to say the electors the unplesant things, he became a politician but remained as outspoken as always. Johnny Munkhammar construed a brilliant argument about the fact that politicians who are making reforms are more likely to be re-elected (thus responding to a concern raised by a respected politician - Jean-Clause Juncker, the Prime Minister of Luxembourg).
I remember well the 90', when the then leaders of Romania, which was still a young democratic country, after escaping with lot of pains from the toughest commnist regime in Europe, tried to convince people of the benefits of adopting a "Swedish model" for the economy, seen as a Land of Promises, instead of embracing privatisation and liberalisation reforms, which were absolutely necessary in order to save a largely inefficient economy. As a result, Romania lost so many years looking to the false promise of a market economy where the State was supposed to take care of all its citizens and where the economy itself was subordinated to the "superior" goal of the State providing wellfare to everybody. The costs of that the time lost and the errors which the "Swedish" model justified in Romania, did nothing more than to prolong its road to recovery. Years later, I discovered Johnny Munkhammar's writtings and, through him, I saw a totally different model - that of people working and competing in order to obtain their wellfare. Thank you, Johnny !
Johnny Munkhammar is no longer with us but his ideas and his thoughts will remain as important bricks at the foundation of the economic freedom in Europe and elswhere.
In a world where people and politicians alike, tired and anxious about the economic future, risk turning too much towards state interventionism, economic nationalism and sheer anti-liberal measures, Johnny Munkhammar will be missed.
In a world where people and politicians alike, tired and anxious about the economic future, risk turning too much towards state interventionism, economic nationalism and sheer anti-liberal measures, Johnny Munkhammar will be missed.
R.I.P.Johnny Munkhammar !
Wednesday, August 29, 2012
The European Court of Justice confirms denial of legal standing for intervention by single victims of an infringement
Is this the right decision ?
Would a more nuanced position of ECJ help proceedings in public and private enforcement ?
Would a more nuanced position of ECJ help proceedings in public and private enforcement ?
In a series of orders of the President of the Court in several related cases - C-589/11 P(I) - Schenker v Air France and Commission, C-590/11 P(I) - Schenker v Air France-KLM and Commission C-596/11 P(I) - Schenker v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij and Commission, C-598/11 P(I) - Schenker v Cathay Pacific Airways and Commission, C-600/11 P(I) - Schenker v Lan Airlines and Others, C-602/11 P(I) - Schenker v Deutsche Lufthansa and Others - issued on 8 June 2012 (http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=123982&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=374708), ECJ rejected the applications lodged by a presumed victim of a cartel to join the proceedings before the Court for annulment of a European Commission decision sanctioning the cartel.
The ECJ decision at stake refers to the air cargo cartel sanctioned in 2010 by the European Commission. The cartel involved Air Canada, Air France-KLM, British Airways, Cathay Pacific, Cargolux, Japan Airlines, LAN Chile, Martinair, SAS, Singapore Airlines and Qantas.
These undertakings applied commonly agreed surcharges for fuel and security. For details see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1487
ECJ confirmed the decision of the General Court which found that Schenker, the applicant, did not have a direct and existing interest in the results of the case and, therefore, it could not benefit of article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
Article 40 of the Statutes of the Court of Justice provide that any person may intervene in front of the Courts of the European Union if such a person can establish an interest in the result of a case submitted to one of those courts. The case-law defined this right to intervene in a restrictive way, as being open to undertakings closer to the matter of the case (members of the same legal entity, competitors of the company which committed an abuse of dominance) or to undertaking which were involved also in the administrative proceedings, as complainant or in any other form. The legal standing as intervening party was also recognised to associations representing a large number of operators active in the sector concerned.
As it may be noticed, the right to intervene is open to undertakings which had something to do with the investigation (like a ”bonus”) or which may help establish the harm caused to specific markets by the illegal behavior of the cartelist. The contours of the right to intervene seem to be limited to entities which have been active or might be useful to the public action or which liability may be invoked, with the exclusion of the private interest for damages by undertakings dealing with the authors of the infringement. The only
The General Court, first and then ECJ decided to stick with the legal precedents, concerned of the fact that the courtroom might become much too crowded if anyone is allowed to jon. ”to recognise that each physical or legal person who could potentially bring a civil action for damages for loss resulting from the anti‑competitive conduct of an undertaking has a direct and existing interest in the result of a case for the purposes of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice would risk seriously undermining the effectiveness of the procedure before the Courts of the European Union”.
Schenker argument that it is, so far,”the only victim of the cartel in question which has filed an application for access to the documents of the administrative procedure carried out by the Commission” could not move the heart of the judges either. Hence, there is no such thing as ”prior tempore, potior jure” applicable in such instances as the mentioned principle is an essential concept of the private law, not the public law.
ECJ decision may be right and appropriate for efficiency reasons but the Court should have a more nuanced - and pragmatic - approach and apply a case-by-case assesment of the usefulness of an application for joining the proceedings. Thus, the Court should check whether or not a single undertaking may bring any clarity to the European Commission decision which validity is discussed. This would mean that it will stick to the strict requirement applied in the case law without throwing away potential useful inputs from single companies, which were not involved in the administrative proceedings.
If the aim for limiting the right to intervene is to avoid the undermining of the effectiveness of its procedure, then being a single company shuould not be regarded, ab initio and without further review, as a sin.
EC
Sunday, August 26, 2012
Apple vs.Samsung - something good about!
The recent ruling of the jury in Northern
District of California in favor of Apple is still a very hot issue and is still
sending hit waves around the world. The
ruling comes after one of the most important legal battles between the two
giants and, arguably, for the technology industries. It is difficult – and risky – to jump now into
conclusionsregarding the likely effects of the decision confirming that
Samsung breached some of tohe Apple’s patents.
Although such comments and predictions, most of
them alarming, started to overflow the websites, the blogs and the magazines all
over the world, until the things will start to settle, I would limit myself to say how the decision of the jury in the Northern District of California SHOULD NOT be regarded.
I try to set a different tone to the comments, as I dislike (and
disapprove) expressions such as “hardware manufactures lining up to pay license
fees to Apple” or “a future Armaghedon on Google”. I understand that journalism
need strong words in order to catch the eye of the reader in respect of what just
happened but the forecasts and conclusions should be written with calm and
equilibrium.
Thus, I will refrain from commenting on how
correct is the ruling itself. From old
times and for the sake of good order in the society, the legal tradition equates
the findings of a court to something which may be called “the truth”. Although I am not original on this, my
only question mark is over the concept of putting the burden of such a case on
the shoulders of a jury, i.e. to seek the truth from persons who may act in
good faith but who may find difficult to ascertain properly the technical
details and the complex relations which are at the core of such a dispute (see,
for the technical antitrust issues, the opinion of Professor Herbert Hovenkamp –
“juries remain a very weak link in a
system where most of the relevant evidence is economic and technical” – The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and
Execution, pag.63). PS: According to
the news, some of the jurors were technology-savvy, which may give more
credibility to their verdict - http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57500358-37/exclusive-apple-samsung-juror-speaks-out/.
So, it looks clear, in this moment, that Samsung did it wrong and failed to respect the legal safety distance from Apple' innovations.
So, it looks clear, in this moment, that Samsung did it wrong and failed to respect the legal safety distance from Apple' innovations.
Coming back to the court decision, these are my
comments:
1) The verdict of the California court should not be regarded as a surprise.
The verdict of the California jury
should not (cannot) be a total surprise for the professionals of the technology
industries and for the managers of the major players in these industries. As it was famously said - “Only the unprepared may be taken by surprise”.
Both hardware manufacturers which walked
into the footsteps of Apple and provide now the world’s consumers with smartphones
and tablets at lower prices than Apple and software providers – such as Google –
should have think to such an outcome, even if undesirable for them, and have prepared
alternative strategies. For those which
were, in fact, unprepared, the ruling may be a – necessary - cold shower, with a
welcomed wakening effect on the them.
2) The market for "drawing boards" has just received a boost.
Samsung and the other competitors of
Apple should learn that the protection of intellectual property is important.
They should learn also that the “short-cuts” such as looking over the shoulders
of the competitors are short-living solutions. And that, definitely, the “short-cuts”
are not highways to the future market success.
3) The competition is not to be won in a courtroom.
The ruling confirming the infringements
of Apple’s patents might reinforce the idea that the clash between Apple,
Samsung and other major players in the technology is moving into the courtrooms,
away from the marketplace but I do not think that this is an efficient strategy
on the long run for any of the competitors.
If Apple chooses to follow such a route and use money for lawyers and court
experts instead of on research, it will have something to lose, eventually, in
the technological race. No big business
in history survived and continued to be successful based mainly on legal
strategies and on fighting in court, but based on innovation and making good
offers to consumers. Raging legal wars against your competitors it may slow them down but it will not make you go faster. The first statements
issued by Apple immediately after the decision indicate that the company is not
willing to follow this (apparently) easier route but the temptation will remain
(Apple should not take Steve Job’s threat against Android “to go thermonuclear” as a
legacy). Apple should not forget also
that there is use and there is abuse of any right. Companies in strong market position may be
tempted to keep their competitors at a safe distance and to slow them down. Eventually, the innovation may start to fade
and the company will try to live an easy life by reaping the fruits of its past
achievements.
4) No company has and no one will have a monopoly on innovation and on all the
necessary patents.
One important aspect Apple should
consider is that it is virtually impossible to have a monopoly on all innovation
and that someday another technological idea will capture the minds of the
consumers and it might not have the patents which encapsulate that idea. And the world of technology is moving fast,
so that patents may start to lose some of their value not because of the
infringements but because may start to become obsolete. Even if Apple will continue to come with good
ideas and brilliant innovations, the number of patents incorporated today in a
single device make it impossible for all these patents to belong to Apple. So, Apple should bear in mind that the world
of technology is more and more interconnected and inter-dependent. The recent decisions of the South Korean
courts are a good example. The Korean decision
is rather low-profile compared with the US decision but the former gives a
better image of the actual status quo of the two parties to the conflict. As Marshall Phelps, the VP for Intelectual
Property at Microsoft puts it – “IP’s
greatest value would lie not so much in being a weapon against competitors, but
rather in serving as a bridge to collaboration with other firms that would
enable companies to acquire the technologies and competencies they needed to
compete successfully”. (Phelps, Marshall; Kline, David. Burning the Ships:
Transforming Your Company's Culture Through Intellectual Property Strategy (p.
5). John Wiley and Sons.). Indeed,
Microsoft offers lot of good examples in this direction.
5) Samsung is an innovator, not a villain.
The ruling did not say (and could
not say) that Samsung phones were,
entirely, copies (clones) of Apple but that Samsung looked too much towards
Apple (“benchmarking on it”, as Samung lawyers put it in court) and that it “free
ride” too much on Apple’s efforts. The signal is that Samsung and others should
have a change of strategy and demonstrate that their innovations enhance the
capabilities of the smartphones and tablets.
The jury only agreed with one third of the damages sought by Apple and
rejected many of its claims, such as alleged infringement of the trade dress
for the iPad.
What happens now seems to have
similarities with the car manufacturers disputes involving European and
Japanese producers. In the 70’ and 80’,
when Europe started to be flooded with Japanese cars, of good quality and cheaper
than some of the European (mostly, German) models, complaints started to be
made about the alleged infringement of patents, such as in the Apple vs.Samsung
case. But because consumers were happy
with the situation and the Japanese cars did have their glow, people used to
say that “the Japanese are replicating the European cars, but are just making them
better”! The Japanese manufacturers might
have copied some successful features of the German brands but for sure they
were innovators, too.
Samsung has lot of things – and innovations –
to be proud of. Let’s not forget that
the range of smartphone and tablets put on the market by Samsung is far more
extended than the limited range of Apple.
Samsung strategy means going into new territories that Apple does not
dare to explore yet (such as smaller size tablets), whilst Apple has a
different strategy and follows the “bitten track” of its famous iPhone and iPad. The future mini-iPad will come after the
market success of lower screen size tablets has been tested by others, Samsung
especially. It should be borne in mind that almost all the devices which came
under scrutiny in the California trial are from the previous generations. The newest Samsung products were not affected
by the litigation in the US Federal Court (Samusng Galaxy III, for example).
A personal notice: I use two mobile phones produced
by Samsung and having Android operating systems. I used to have an iPhone -a good phone but
Samsung offered me a better user experience, so I gave it up quickly. I also used for a long time an iPad 2 and I
was impressed about the quality of the device.
This did not stop me in turning recently to a Samsung tablet. I was happy with both Samsung and Apple but I
give preference to Android. Apple
products are for those who may afford an iPhone or an iPad, Android is for
anyone who can afford a smartphone (and there are more and more low-price
smartphones). The future of the
smartphones and their affordability to the ordinary people depends on the
success of Android. It depends also on the success of Microsoft software into
this area and I think that Microsoft may be a formidable challenger for Apple’s
supremacy if it will decide to aim high on the markets for smartphones and
tablet PCs.
So, as a preliminary conclusion, the world of technology may not be the same
after the verdict of the California jury but it might well be a better one,
if the lessons are well learnt by all the involved parties.
UPDATE: According to news released by Reuters on 31 August 2012 Google Inc Chief Executive Larry Page and Apple CEO Tim Cook have been conducting behind-the-scenes talks about a range of intellectual property matters, including the mobile patent disputes between the companies. More, on http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-google-apple-idUSBRE87T15H20120830?goback=%2Egde_4472581_member_157048583
UPDATE: According to news released by Reuters on 31 August 2012 Google Inc Chief Executive Larry Page and Apple CEO Tim Cook have been conducting behind-the-scenes talks about a range of intellectual property matters, including the mobile patent disputes between the companies. More, on http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/30/us-google-apple-idUSBRE87T15H20120830?goback=%2Egde_4472581_member_157048583
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
"Blogul-de-concurenta" becomes "Stateofcompetition"
From today, "Blogul-de-concurenta" becomes "Stateofcompetition" !
This is not just an change of name, but announces that this blog intends to cover in the future a wider range of issues, extending from competition itself into such directions as the freedom of the enterprises, innovation and the balance between private and public interests.
The blog would like to provide useful insights and indications as to the state of health of the competition and the economy as a whole, in Romania, in the European Union and elswhere.
You are welcomed to read, to get involved, to bring in your friends, to approve or to disapprove the views expressed on this blog.
Yours,
Valentin MIRCEA
Saturday, August 18, 2012
The Role of the Constitutional Court of Romania in guaranteeing the functioning of the market economy
The paper has been published in the book ”Repere actuale ale jurisprudentei Curtii Constitutionale”, edited by Judge Silviu Barbu of the Brasov Court of Appeal, lecturer in law at the Law School of the Bucharest University and published recently (July 2012) at Indaco Systems Publishing House - see
http://www.centruldecarteindaco.ro/Book/Index/597/Repere-actuale-din-Jurisprudenta-Curtii-Constitutionale.
Abstract:
The article focuses on a less obvious attribution of the Romanian
Constitutional Court, i.e. its role to safeguard and to protect the freedom of
the enterprise and the free market principle.
Unlike other constitutions in the developped countries, Romanian
Constitution expressly provides the right to undertake a private economic
activity (article 45) and the principle that the Romanian economy is a market
economy (article 135). The author argues
that the respect of these fondamental provisions is key to the protection of
the other economic rights (such as the right to work) and even for the
political rights of the citizens. On the
other hand, the market economy in Romania is still fragile and there are many
temptations to raise entry barriers in specific industries or to issue rules in
favor of certain entities. Sometimes, the rules which discriminate and are
contrary to the free market principle are included in laws issued by the
Parliament, which are out of the reach of the Competition Council, which is
competent to ask in courts the cancelation of lower-level legal norms (local
councils decisions, Government decisions) when contrary to the competition
rules. In this context, the
Constitutional Court plays an essential role in ensuring the proper functioning
of the market economy by striking-out the legal norms contrary to the freedom
of the enterprise and the free market economy.
Further comments:
Interestingly, between the time of drafting and the moment when the paper was published, the Constitutional Court issued a decision (Decision 498/10 May 2012), which represents an almost ”hystorical” change of course in its jurisprudence and it may be considered as a major turning point in the approach the Constitutional Court has towards legal norms infringing the freedom to compete and to perform economic activities - see the decision at http://www.ccr.ro/decisions/pdf/ro/2012/D0498_12.pdf.
Through this decision, the Court struck down one of the first legal provisions which came into force in Romania after the opening of the economy to the free market principles, in 1990. The legal norms in discussion were forbidding retailers of food products to buy these from other retailers of such goods, but only from wholesellers, subject to administrative and even criminal sanctions. In the past, the Constitutional Court rejected requests to declare this legal provision as void. This time, the Court argued that it needs to take into account the change in the economic realities and that the legal interdiction introduced in 1990 no longer corresponds to the free market economy principle. The Court correctly noted that economic operators may acquire goods from whatever source they want, as long as the sale of such goods is not limited due to specific charateristics (weapons, drugs etc), thus the consumers receiving the benefits. In additon, the Court stated that the principle of the freedom to peforma economic activities, to buy and to sell goods, is a fondamental principle of the market economy and an essential condition for its the existence.
Beyond Decision 498/2012 itself, what is important is that this signals the intention of the Constitutional Court to pay more attention to the limits of competition introduced in the laws.
Full text article (Romanian):
Rolul
Curţii Constituţionale a României în garantarea funcţionării
economiei de piaţă
Economia de piaţă este un mecanism a cărui funcţionare
corespunzătoare este apanajul predominant al agenţilor implicaţi (operatorii
economici). Care ar fi, în aceste
condiţii, rolul Curţii Constituţionale în ceea ce priveşte funcţionarea corectă
a economiei de piaţă. În cele ce urmează
vom argumenta de ce Curtea Constituţională joacă, în realitate, un rol foarte
important în asigurarea bunei funcţionări a economiei de piaţă. Importanţa acestui rol pleacă de la poziţia
extrem de importantă a Curţii Constituţionale, de judecător suprem al actelor
normative emise de către Parlament şi care reglementează direct modalitatea de
desfăşurare a activităţii operatorilor economici sau instituie cadrul general
pentru reglementarea acestei activităţi de către autorităţile sectoriale sau de
către autorităţile administraţiei publice centrale.
Libera iniţiativă şi economia de piaţă în Constituţia României
Spre deosebire
constituţiile din multe alte jurisdicţii, inclusiv cele din ţările dezvoltate
din punct de vedere economic, Constituţia României conţine prevederi exprese în
ceea ce priveşte iniţiativa privată şi concurenţa[1].
Astfel,
art.135, alin. (1), din Constituţie prevede că:
„Economia Romaniei este economie de piaţă,
bazată pe libera initiativă şi concurenţă.” iar alin. (2), litera a) al
aceluiaşi art. 135 prevede că “Statul
trebuie să asigure: libertatea comerţului, protecţia concurentei loiale,
crearea cadrului favorabil pentru valorificarea tuturor factorilor de productie”.
Art. 135, alin. (1) şi (2), litera a) se află în
corelaţie directă cu art. 45 din Constituţie care consacră libertatea
economică, ca libertate fundamentală a cetăţenilor României:
„Accesul liber al
persoanei la o activitate economică, libera initiativă si exercitarea acestora
in conditiile legii sunt garantate”.
În vreme ce art.135, alin. (1) există încă din prima
formă a Constituţiei României, intrată în vigoare în 1991[2] dar într-o
formă mai succcintă („Economia României este econome de piaţă”), libertatea
economică a fost consacrată, cu forţă de libertate fundamentală, doar după
revizuirea Constituţiei în anul 2003. Constatăm astfel, o sporire a atenţiei
acordată de către legiuitorul constituţional iniţiativei private şi concurenţei.
După cum s-a apreciat în doctrina de specialitate,
libertatea economică este un corolar al dreptului de proprietate privată,
prevăzut de art.44 (iniţial, art.41) din Constituţie[3],
la realizarea căruia contribuie. Într-adevăr dreptul de proprietate privată nu
poate fi conceput şi nu poate fi valorificat pe deplin fără existenţa
libertăţii economice, adică a libertăţii de a folosi şi de a dispune de dreptul
de prorietate privată în scopul obţinerii unor beneficii economice pentru
titular. Se remarcă, în acest context, că libertatea economică conferă
dreptului de proprietate privată o dimensiune dinamică şi transformă dreptul de
proprietate dintr-o noţiune statică într-un concept „viu”, în măsură să
contribuie şi la realizarea obiectivelor altor prevederi din legea fundamentală
cum sunt dreptul la muncă prevăzut de art.41, alin. (1) - garantarea libertăţii
economice creează condiţii pentru crearea de locuri de muncă sau dreptul la un
nivel de trai decent, prevăzut de art.47 din Constituţie – măsurile de
dezvoltare economică promovate de stat sunt cel mai bine realizate prin
stimularea şi protejarea libertăţii economice şi a mecanismelor economiei de
piaţă.
Într-o abordare mai largă, consacrarea şi garantarea
libertăţii economice şi a mecanismelor economiei de piaţă sunt o condiţie
esenţială pentru apărarea altor drepturi şi libertăţi fundamentale, cum sunt
cele politice. În condiţiile în care cetăţenii se bucură liber de drepturile
lor economice, aceştia vor fi mai motivaţi să se implice în viaţa „cetăţii”,
prin exercitarea dreptului la vot sau a dreptului la asociere. Libertatea politică nu este de conceput în
absenţa libertăţii economice iar evoluţiile istorice din multe state ale lumii[4]
au demonstrat că existenţa libertăţii economice a generat, de-a lungul
timpului, mişcări sociale care au obţinut recunoaşterea drepturilor politice
pentru cetăţeni şi deschiderea sistemelor politice către democraţii pe deplin
funcţionale. Este de remarcat grija
autorilor Constituţiei României, inclusiv cu ocazia revizuirii acesteia în
2003, de a insera cu forţă de principii, în legea fundamentală, libertatea
economică şi funcţionarea economiei României ca economie de piaţă. Demersul era
justificat de nevoia de evitare a revenirii la economia centralizată, de
comandă, caracteristică regimului comunist şi care produsese consecinţe
dezastruoase în ceeea ce priveşte economia României şi nivelul de trai al
locuitorilor.
Curtea Constituţională – arbitru necesar al libertăţii economice şi al
economiei de piaţă
Cu toate că politicile economice promovate de către
autoritatea executivă au un rol covârşitor în ceea ce priveşte existenţa unei economii
naţionale eficiente şi prospere, Curtea Constituţională poate juca un rol
foarte important în acest sens, prin interpretarea pe care este chemată să o
dea conceptelor de libertate economică şi liberă concurenţă şi cenzurarea
normelor legale care pot afecta exerciţiul drepturilor consacrate de
Constituţie.
Politicile publice în materie economică sunt adesea
fluctuante şi sunt influenţate, în diferite momente în istorie, de factori
diverşi cum sunt: contextul economic la nivelul Uniunii Europene sau la nivel
mondial, demersuri şi iniţiative venite din partea unor grupuri sociale sau
profesionale, în susţinerea intereselor acestora sau abordări diferite în ceea
ce priveşte rolul statului în economie sau privind modalitatea de alocare a
resurselor. În acest context, rolul Curţii Constituţionale este acela de
asigurare a stabilităţii şi de a fixa, prin repere jurisdicţionale, cadrul în
care pot fi puse în aplicare politicile publice în materie economică, prin
cenzurarea normelor legale în care acestea se materializează.
Noţiunile menţionate, de libertate economică şi de liberă
concurenţă, ca şi alte noţiuni asociate acestora şi menţionate în textul legii
fundamentale – cum este „concurenţa loială” – nu sunt definite şi nu sunt detaliate
şi, de altfel, nici nu ar fi putut fi detaliate în textele constituţionale,
revenind Curţii Constituţionale atributul de a defini conţinutul acestora şi de
a stabili limitele în care pot fi permise derogări.
Deşi deciziile Curţii Constituţionale nu constituie surse
de drept pozitiv, acestea au un rol important în ceea ce priveşte evitarea
limitării libertăţii economice sau a afectării mecanismelor liberei concurenţe
prin acte normative cu putere de lege.
Este interesant de remarcat că actele normative cu un
statut inferior legii (hotărâri ale unor consilii locale sau judeţene, decizii
ale unor autorităţi ale administraţiei publice centrale, hotărâri de guvern) pot
fi invalidate, inclusiv pe motivul încălcării regulilor din art.45 şi 135,
alin. (1) din Constituţie, prin acţiuni iniţiate în faţa instanţelor
judecătoreşti de către Consiliul Concurenţei în baza atribuţiilor conferite
acestei autorităţi publice de Legea concurenţei nr.21/1996, republicată[5]
(numită în cele ce urmează „Legea concurenţei”)[6].
Conform art.9, alin. (1) din Legea concurenţei „Sunt interzise
orice acţiuni sau inacţiuni ale autorităţilor şi instituţiilor administraţiei
publice centrale ori locale şi ale entităţilor către care acestea îşi deleagă
atribuţiile, care restrâng, împiedică sau denaturează concurenţa, precum:
a) limitarea libertăţii comerţului sau autonomiei
întreprinderilor, exercitate cu respectarea reglementărilor legale;
Dacă autoritatea de concurenţă sesizează existenţa unor
acte normative care contravin prevederii legale de mai sus, aceasta poate
declanşa o investigaţie împotriva autorităţii publice emitente. Dacă
investigaţia ajunge la concluzia că prevederea normativă afectează libertatea
comerţului sau autonomia întreprinderilor, ori că aceasta stabileşte condiţii
discrimnatorii pentru întreprinderi, Consiliul Concurenţei impune, prin
decizie, un termen în vederea conformării – modificării sau eliminării
prevederiii ilegale. Dacă nici după
expirarea acestui termen situaţia nu este remediată, Consiliul Concurenţei
poate introduce, conform art.9, alin. (2) din Legea concurenţei, acţiune în
faţa Curţii de Apel Bucureşti,
solicitând instanţei, după caz, „anularea,
în tot sau în parte, a actului care a condus la restrângerea, împiedicarea ori
denaturarea concurenţei, obligarea autorităţii sau instituţiei în cauză să emită
un act administrativ ori să efectueze o anumită operaţiune administrativă”.
Consiliul Concurenţei nu are atribuţii în ceea ce priveşte anularea directă a
unor prevederi normative neconforme cu
libertatea economică şi cu principiile economiei de piaţă, din raţiuni ce ţin
de ierarhia autorităţilor din cadrul puterii executive. Rolul şi forţa sa în invalidarea acestor
norme juridice sunt însă considerabile, cu atât mai mult cu cât art.49 din
Legea concurenţei sancţionează cu nulitatea absolută prevederile normative
contrare art.9 alin. (1) din această lege.
Se observă că acţiunile sau inacţiunile[7]
menţionate în prevederea legală de mai sus pot fi, în egală măsură, contrare
art.45 şi art.135, alin. (1) din Constituţia României. Consiliul Concurenţei nu poate verifica şi
cenzura aplicarea unei dispoziţii legale cu putere de lege, atribut exclusiv al
Curţii Constituţionale. Un asemenea
control ar contraveni principiului separării puterilor în stat, în condiţiile
în care Consiliul Concurenţei, parte a puterii executive nu poate cenzura
actele emise de către Parlament. Consiliul Concurenţei poate formula însă
recomandări, în baza art.26, alin. (1), litera l) din Legea concurenţei sau
poate emite puncte de vedere, la solicitarea unor comisii parlamentare, a unor
senatori sau deputaţi, în baza art.29 din Legea concurenţei.
Rolul de a verifica conformitatea prevederilor legale
cuprinse într-o lege cu principiile economiei de piaţă revine, în mod
primordial, Curţii Constituţionale a României.
Curtea Constituţională constituie, astfel, vârful piramidei
instituţionale concepute pentru protejarea economiei de piaţă şi este un
element important de contracarare a tendinţelor de limitare a libertăţii
economice şi de alterare a mecanismelor concurenţiale. Având în vedere
identitatea de raţiune, considerăm că modalităţile de restrângere, împiedicare
sau denaturare a concurenţei prevăzute de art.9, alin. (1) din Legea
concurenţei ar putea fi avute în vedere şi de către Curtea Constituţională.
Astfel, se observă că noţiunile de „libertatea economică”, din cadrul art.45
din Constituţie şi „limitarea libertăţii
comerţului şi a autonomiei întreprinderilor”, sunt practic
echivalente. Întocmai ca şi în cazul
libertăţii economice prevăzute de art.45 din Constituţie, al cărei exerciţiu
poate fi restrâns în condiţiile art.53 din Constituţie, libertatea comerţului
şi autonomiei întreprinderii sunt, conform Legii concurenţei, „exercitate cu respectarea reglementările legale”.
Chiar şi mai importantă este evitarea existenţei unor
condiţii discrimnatorii pentru activitatea diferitelor întreprinderi, prin
normele juridice cuprinse în legi.
Existenţa acestui reper în activitatea de analiză întreprinsă de Curtea
Constituţională decurge, de altfel, şi din principiul egalităţii în faţa legii,
prevăzut de art.16 din Constituţie.
Curtea Constituţională ar trebui să procedeze, în fiecare
caz în care este invocată afectarea libertăţii economice a indivizilor şi a
întreprinderilor, la o analiză aprofundată a posibilelor efecte negative ale
normei juridice analizate asupra mediului de afaceri, inclusiv prin solicitarea
adresată iniţiatorilor de a justifica, prin argumente economice pertinente,
includerea într-o lege a unor dispoziţii cu caracter restrictiv[8]. Aşa cum menţiona judecătorul american Richard
Posner „ştiinţa economică poate furniza perspective asupra unor întrebări care
necesită o corectă interpretare legală” iar „limitele abordării economice în
soluţionarea unui contencios constituţional sunt cele stabilite de însăşi
Constituţia”[9].
Concluzii care rezultă din jurisprudenţa Curţii Constituţionale
Deciziile Curţii Constituţionale în care aceasta a fost
chemată să se pronunţe cu privire la constituţionalitatea unor legi, prin
raportare la art.135, alin. (1) sau art.45 din Constituţia României nu sunt
foarte numeroase, mult mai puţine, oricum, decât cele în care prevederea
constituţională invocată este, de exemplu, art.44 din Constituţie. Este de aşteptat însă ca numărul cauzelor
care implică cele două prevederi constituţionale să crească, având în vedere
nivelul de dezvoltare al economiei de piaţă din România, creşterea numărului de
norme juridice şi creşterea tensiunilor între operatorii economici.
În ceea ce priveşte jurisprudenţa de până în prezent,
remarcăm atenţia acordată de către judecătorii Curţii Constituţionale
aspectelor care ţin de conformitatea legislaţiei româneşti cu regulile
economiei de piaţă, precum şi echilibrul opiniilor exprimate, în sensul protejării
atât al liberei concurenţe cât şi a altor obiective stabilite de Constituţie – satisfacerea
unui interes public şi bunăstarea consumatorilor.
Ca decizii care se integrează în cele exprimate mai sus menţionăm,
cu titlu de exemplu:
-
Decizia Curţii Constituţionale nr.133 din 6 iulie 2000 referitoare la excepţia de neconstituţionalitate a
dispoziţiilor art. 5 alin. (1) din Ordonanţa de urgenţă a Guvernului nr. 7/1998
privind preţurile şi tarifele produselor şi serviciilor care se execută sau se
prestează în ţară în cadrul activităţilor cu caracter de monopol natural, al
celor supuse prin lege unui regim special sau al regiilor autonome, care se
stabilesc cu avizul Oficiului Concurenţei, aprobată prin Legea nr. 88/1999[10].
În analiza textelor legale atacate de autorii excepţiei de
neconstituţionalitate, Curtea Constituţională a arătat, în mod judicios, că nu
poate fi vorba de încălcarea fostului art.134, alineat 1 din Constituţia
României în condiţiile în care norma legală se referea la activităţi cu caracter
de monopol natural, unde este de principiu ca nu există un mecanism
concurenţial care să ducă la stabilirea, prin mecanisme ale economiei de piaţă,
a unui nivel corect al preţurilor.
-
Decizia Curţii Constituţionale
nr. 644 din 10 iunie 2008 referitoare la excepţia de neconstituţionalitate a
prevederilor art. 67 alin. (5) din Legea nr.38/2003 privind transportul în
regim de taxi şi în regim de închiriere[11].
În acest caz Curtea a fost sesizată să se pronunţe asupra interdicţiei de
a folosi unul şi acelaşi autovehicul pentru activităţi de transport de persoane
(taximetrie) şi pentru activitatea de instructaj auto şi a concluzionat că
aceasta nu împietează asupra liberei iniţiative garantată de art.45 din
Constituţia României având în vedere că interdicţia derivă direct din
condiţiile tehnice diferite care trebuie îndeplinite de către un autovehicul
dedicat fiecăreia dintre cele două activităţi.
Deciziile mai vechi ale Curţii Constituţionale,
pronunţate în baza art.134, alineat (1) din Constituţia din 1991 (şi în absenţa
actualului art.45 din Constituţie), sunt însă criticabile sub aspectul
acceptării cu prea mare uşurinţă a argumentelor în favoarea restrângerii unor
forme de comerţ, fără efectuarea unei analize temeinicie sau solicitarea unei
astfel de analize unor autorităţi specializate ale statului.
Menţionăm, tot exempli
gratia, Decizia Curţii Constituţionale nr. 48 din 17
mai 1995 privind excepţia de neconstituţionalitate a prevederilor art. 1 lit.
g) din Legea nr. 12/1990[12]. În acest caz, Curtea Constituţională a
respins excepţia de neconstituţionalitate a unei prevederi legale care
interzicea „cumpărarea de mărfuri sau produse în scop de revânzare, de la
unităţile de desfacere cu amănuntul, de alimentaţie publică, cantine, unităţi
de turism şi alte unităţi similare”. În
argumentaţia sa, preluată din susţinerile autorităţii publice pârâte – Garda
Financiară – Curtea a arătat că prevederea legală din art.1, litera g) din
Legea 12/1990 „acestea reflectă chiar spiritul textului constituţional, de
vreme ce stabilesc şi sancţionează activităţile comerciale ilicite, de natură
să încalce principiile concurenţei loiale şi să aducă atingere intereselor
consumatorilor prin mărirea în mod artificial a preţurilor.”
În realitate, Curtea Constituţională ar fi trebuit să
aibă în vedere faptul o creştere de preţ nu era inevitabilă câtă vreme
unităţile de comercializare menţionate în prevederea legală puteau şi aveau
interesul să acorde discounturi şi rabaturi la preţul de vânzare, astfel încât
preţul de revânzare al cumpărătorului putea fi în egală măsură mai mic decât
preţul vânzătorului însuşi. În plus, activitatea de revânzare nu afecta, prin
ea însăşi, interesele consumatorilor, câtă vreme produsele achiziţionate puteau
fi incorporate în alte produse finite, căpătând astfel o valoare de utilizare
mai mare, ce justifica preţul mai ridicat.
Prevederea legală era defectuoasă prin faptul că sancţiona nu revânzarea
ci cumpărare „în scop de revânzare”, ceea ce era de natură să conducă la o
aplicare excesivă a interdicţiei şi la dificultăţi mari în aplicarea practică –
care ar fi fost situaţia dacă achiziţia nu se făcea în scop de revânzare, ci
intenţia revânzării apărea ulterior, mai ales dacă acest lucru se întâmpla din
cauze externe cumpărătorului (de exemplu, deprecierea unor produse perisabile).
Din contra-argumentele faţă de decizia Curţii
Constituţionale, menţionate mai sus, rezultă cât de important este ca
judecătorii Curtea Constituţionale să încerce să evalueze normele legale care
privesc activităţile economice private din perspectiva raţiunii economice şi nu
a unor motivaţii care sună bine dar care nu rezistă examenului practicii.
Tentaţia restricţiilor şi rolul Curţii Constituţionale de gardian al
economiei de piaţă
România a parcurs, din 1991, de la adoptarea Constituţiei,
în forma sa iniţială, un drum lung în ceea ce priveşte deschiderea economiei
către iniţiativa privată şi economia de piaţă. Procesul de liberalizare şi de
privatizare a fost considerabil, astfel că în prezent peisajul economic al
României este complet diferit de cel anterior anului 1989. Economia României nu a ajuns încă la capătul
acestui drum şi practica a arătat că acesta nu este întotdeauna un drum drept
sau lipsit de greutăţi. Există numeroase
încercări de a orienta reglementările legislative către protejarea unor interse
particulare şi astfel, se constată paşi înapoi şi obstacole – introducerea unor
elemente de control administrativ, fără o justificare obiectivă (birocratizare
excesivă), ridicarea unor bariere cât mai înalte privind accesul pe anumite
pieţe, favorizarea unor întreprinderi în detrimentul altora sau a
consumatorilor – care fac ca acest drum să fie sinuos.
Printre tendinţele cele mai dăunătoare pentru economia de
piaţă dar şi pentru interesul public, în general, menţionăm demersurile multor
profesii de a edicta norme juridice prin care să fie condiţionat (îngreunat)
accesul în aceste profesii, concomitent cu impunerea, prin acte administrative
sau prin auto-reglementare a profesiei a unor elemente care ar trebui să facă,
în mod normal, obiect al interacţiunii acestor profesii cu consumatorii (de
exemplu, preţurile şi tarifele). O
trăsătură comună a tuturor acestor demersuri, pro domo, o reprezintă invocarea
unor raţiuni de interes public şi de protecţie a consumatorilor. În realitate, ceea ce rezultă, cu intenţie
sau nu, din reglementarea excesivă, este, adesea, ridicarea de bariere la
intrarea pe piaţă, limitarea artificială a numărului celor care exercită
profesia reglementată, cu consecinţe directe dăunătoare, cum este creşterea
preţurilor sau reducerea inovării pentru crearea de produse şi servicii noi.
Un alt proces cu efecte negative îl reprezintă menţinerea
unor vechi monopoluri publice sau, mai grav, crearea unor noi monopoluri sau
drepturi exclusive, în favoarea anumitor operatori economici sau a unor
profesii.
Introducerea de bariere administrative şi reglementarea
excesivă a unor domenii de activitate economică sunt o reflectare perfectă a
dictonului „drumul către iad este pavat cu intenţii bune”. Este rolul Curţii Constituţionale de a veghea
ca orice limitare a libertăţii economice să se facă în situaţii extreme, în
condiţiile restrictive ale art.53 din Constituţia României. Libertatea
economică, înţelească ca libertate a oricărei persoane de a exercita orice
activitate economică, reprezintă o regulă fundamentală societăţii româneşti,
astfel că excepţiile de la aceasta vor fi, în mod firesc, rare, şi vor trebuie
să fie temeinic fundamentate, pe considerente obiective, inclusiv raţionamente
de ordin economic. Existenţa a prea
multor excepţii şi, mai ales, lipsa lor de fundamentare, obiectivă, ar fi în
măsură să golească de substanţă şi să riscă să anuleze principiul libertăţii
economice.
Standardul cu care judecătorul constituţional trebuie să
judece respectarea principiului libertăţii economice trebuie să fie acelaşi
utilizat în contextul analizării respectării libertăţii individuale. După cum am arătat mai sus, libertatea
economică este o condiţie esenţială pentru prezervarea libertăţilor politice
ale indivizilor. Un alt argument în sensul utilizării aceluiaşi standard
ridicat este că libertatea economică este cea mai în măsură să ducă la
realizarea bunăstării societăţii, prin impli-carea cât mai multor membri ai
acestora.
După cum s-a spus în numeroase ocazii, economia de piaţă,
ca şi democraţia[13], nu
este un sistem perfect dar este cel mai bun din cele concepute până în prezent.
[1] De exemplu, constituţiile din Statele Unite ale Americii sau Germania nu
conţin prevederi de tipul celor din art.135 sau art.45 din Constituţia
României.
[2] În cadrul formei iniţiale a Constituţiei, această prevedere era numerotată
ca art.134, alin. (1).
[3] I. Muraru, S. Tănăsescu – Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, ediţia 14, vol. I,
editura C.H. Beck, 2011, p.178.
[4] Exemplele în acest sens sunt
numeroase, de la Magna Carta Libertatum din Anglia (1215) la transformările
democratice din Coreea de Sud, Taiwan, Hong-Kong în ultimul deceniu al
secolului al XX-lea.
[5] Astfel cum a fost
aceasta modificată şi completată de Ordonanţa de Urgenţă a Guvernului
nr.75/2010, aprobată cu modificări şi completări de Legea 141/2011.
[6] Pentru detalii, vezi V.Mircea, Legislaţia concurenţei.Comentarii şi explicaţii, Editura C.H.Beck,
2012, pag.59-61.
[7] Este de remarcat posibilitatea considerării ca nelegală
şi a lipsei unei acţiuni necesare funcţionării în condiţii normale a
întreprinderilor, ceea ce induce ideea că autorităţile şi instituţiile publice
centrale au, în concepţia Legii concurenţei, o obligaţie pozitivă de a acţiona
în vederea evitării restrângerii sau denaturării concurenţei.
[8] Notăm, în acest context,
existenţa unei ramuri a ştiinţelor economice care tratează raporturile dintre
normele constituţionale şi economie – economia constituţională. Reprezentantul cel mai cunsoscut al acestei
ramuri este James Buchanan care a primit, în 1986, premiul Nobel pentru
economie, pentru dezvoltarea fundamentelor contractuale şi constituţionale
pentru teoria procesului economic şi politic de adoptare a deciziilor.
[9] R.Posner, The Constitution as an
Economic Document, George Washington University Law Review, 1987-1988, p.4-38.
[10] Publicată în Monitorul Oficial cu numărul 465 din data de
25 septembrie 2000.
[11] Publicat
în Monitorul Oficial al României cu numărul 506 din data de 4 iulie 2008
[12] Publicată în Monitorul Oficial cu numărul 224 din data de
29 septembrie 1995.
[13] “S-a spus că democraţia este
cea mai proastă formă de guvernământ, cu excepţia tuturor celorlalte forme,
care au fost încercate din când în când”, Winston Churchil
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